Most modern block ciphers are built using components whose cryptographic strength is evaluated in terms of their resistance to attacks on the whole cipher. In particular, differential properties of vectorial Boolean functions are studied for the S-Boxes to thwart differential cryptanalysis. Little is known on similar properties to avoid trapdoors in the design of the block cipher. In this paper we present a form of trapdoors coming from alternative vector space structures, which we call hidden sums, and give a characterization on the Boolean function S-Box to avoid any such hidden sum. We also study some properties of this new class of vectorial Boolean functions, which we call anti-crooked, and provide a toy cipher with a hidden sum trapdoor.
Introduction
Most modern block ciphers are built using components whose cryptographic strength is evaluated in terms of the resistance offered to attacks on the whole cipher. In particular, differential properties of Boolean functions are studied for the S-Boxes to thwart differential cryptanalysis ( [3, 21] ).
Little is known on similar properties to avoid trapdoors in the design of the block cipher. In [6] the authors investigate the minimal properties for the S-Boxes (and the mixing layer) of an AES-like cipher (more precisely, a translation-based cipher, or tb cipher) to thwart the trapdoor coming from the imprimitivity action, first noted in [23] . Later, in [7] the authors provide stronger conditions on the S-Boxes of a tb cipher that avoid attacks coming from any group action. This result has been generalized to tb ciphers over any field in [1] .
In this paper we present a form of trapdoors coming from alternative vector space structure, which we call hidden sums and study from a group action point of view in Section 2. In Section
On hidden sums
Let p ≥ 2 be a prime and F p be the finite field with p elements. Let V = (F p ) d . As observed by Li [19] , the symmetric group Sym(V ) will contain many isomorphic copies of the affine group AGL(V ), which are its conjugates in Sym(V ). So there are several structures (V, •) of an F pvector space on the set V , where (V, •) is the abelian additive group of the vector space. Each of these structure will yield in general a different copy AGL(V, •) of the affine group within Sym(V ). Any AGL(V, •) consists of the maps x → g(x) • v, where g ∈ GL(V, •), and v ∈ V .
Assumption 1. Let G be a subgroup of Sym(V ).
• G is contained in the affine subgroup AGL(V, •)
• G contains T , an abelian regular subgroup
For the rest of this section we consider the previous assumption and we call any • a hidden sum for G. Since T is regular, for each x ∈ V there exists unique σ x ∈ T such that σ x (0) = x, therefore T = T V = {σ y | y ∈ V }. Since T is abelian regular subgroup contained in G, we obtain that T is an abelian regular subgroup of AGL(V, •). By [5, 8] we can define simultaneously both a structure of an associative, commutative, nilpotent ring (V, •, ·) on V and an operation ✷ on V such that (V, ✷) is an abelian p-group. The two operations are linked by
and
Lemma 2.1. For each u ∈ V , the set uV is a subgroup of V with respect to both • and ✷.
Proof. Since the distributive property between • and · holds in (V, •, ·), then we have
for all x ∈ V . We denote by ⊟t and ⊖t the opposite of t with respect to ✷ and •, respectively. By (2) we can write
for all x ∈ V and so we obtain
In fact the map (V, ✷) → T , y → σ y , is an isomorphism and we now show that the related map (V, ✷) → GL(V, •), y → κ y , is a group homomorphism.
Proposition 2.2. For every x, y
Therefore κ V = {k x | x ∈ V } is a p-group and so it acts unipotently on (V, •).
Proof. For every x, y, z ∈ V , we have
so from associativity we obtain κ y ✷ z = κ κ z (y)•z = κ z κ y .
It follows that κ V is a group, image of the homomorphism which sends y ∈ V to κ y ∈ κ V , so κ V is a p-group and thus acts unipotently on (V, •).
By the previous proposition and some well-known results on unipotent groups (see for instance [15] ), we note that there exists y ∈ V \ {0} such that κ x (y) = y for each x ∈ V and so we can consider U = {y ∈ V | x ✷ y = x • y for all x ∈ V } = {0}. We observe that U is a subgroup of both the structures (V, •) and (V, ✷).
Let a ∈ V \ {0}, we define the derivative of ρ with respect to a and ✷ as D a (ρ, ✷) : [18] , that is, for each a ∈ V \ {0} the set
Let 1 G ∈ G be the identity of G. We conclude this section with the main theorem linking the AC property with the existence of hidden sums with respect to G. Proof. By contradiction G is contained in an affine subgroup AGL(V, •) of Sym(V ) and there is an AC ρ ∈ G. So G satisfies Assumption 1 and our preliminary results hold. Since ρ is •-affine and κ y ∈ GL(V, •), by (3) for a ∈ U and x ∈ V it follows that
x = κ ⊟x for every x ∈ V and ρ is a permutation we have W = {κ x (ρ(a)) | x ∈ V }. For the sake of simplicity, we set ρ(a) =ā. By (1) and (2) we have κ x (ā) =ā • xā and (2) we also obtain that x • y = κ −1 y (x)✷y for every x, y ∈ V , and sō
We also have that κ ✷) ) is a ✷-coset of V for any a ∈ U, which contradicts the assumption that ρ is AC with respect to ✷.
Regularity-based block ciphers over F p
We introduce a block cipher defined over a finite field F p , where the key action is not necessarily defined via the usual translations on the message space V , rather it can be abelian regular group acting on V . Indeed there are many block cipher where the keys act in a less traditional way (e.g. GOST [16] , SAFER [20] , Kalyna [22] ).
Let C = {ϕ k | k ∈ K } be a block cipher for which the plaintext space V = (F p ) d , for some d ∈ N, coincides with the ciphertext space, where any encryption function ϕ k ∈ Sym(V ) and K is the key space. Suppose that any ϕ k is the composition of l round functions, that is, permutations ϕ k,1 , . . . , ϕ k,l , where each ϕ k,h is determined by a session key k ∈ K and the round index h. For each h define the group generated by the h-round functions
and the group generated by all Γ h (C )'s
In the literature, "round" often refers either to the "round index" or to the "round function".
We also assume that V is the Cartesian product
where n > 1, and the V i 's are subspaces of V with dim
such that T i is abelian and acts regularly on V i . Thanks to the results in the previous section, we have
So we can define the regular action of T on V as the following parallel action
Clearly any γ ∈ T is a bricklayer transformation. Now we generalise the definition of translation based cipher C over F p (Definition 3.3 in [1] ) to include more general key actions. • γ h is a bricklayer transformation not depending on k and γ h (0) = 0,
Definition 3.2. A block cipher
• λ h is a group automorphism of (V, ✷) not depending on k, We now work in the group Γ h (C ), for a fixed h, omitting for simplicity the indices h for the various functions. Write ρ = λ γ. Since for h 0 the map
We are ready to prove the main result of this paper. Proof. By contradiction G = Γ h 0 (C ) is contained in a copy AGL(V, •) of the affine group of Sym(V ). By (5) we are under Assumption 1 and by the proof of Theorem 2.5 we obtain that if a = 0 and a ∈ U = {0}, with
Since λ is an automorphism of (V, ✷), applying λ −1 to Im(D a (ρ, ✷)), by definition of ✷ and γ we obtain
Choosing one non-zero a ∈ U, then there is a non-zero component a i ∈ V i of a, and we have that the projection
So we obtain a contradiction since γ i is AC.
On anti crooked functions
In this section we consider the interesting case p = 2, and we give some properties on the anticrookedness of a Boolean function with respect to the usual structure (V, +). 
The differential uniformity of f is
Those functions such that δ ( f ) = 2 are said almost perfect nonlinear (APN).
We restrict from now on to the case m = n, any times we write that f is a vBf, we will implicit mean f :
We recall the following definition presented recently in [6] .
Definition 4.2. Let f be a vBf. f is weakly-APN if
The notion of weakly-APN function was introduced as a necessary condition to avoid a subtle trapdoor coming from imprimitive actions (see [6] ). A direct check shows that an APN function is a weakly-APN. However, functions that are weakly-APN but not APN are of interest as shown in the following. Proof. We have Im(D a f ) = w + W where W is a F-vector subspace of F 2 m for some w ∈ F 2 m . Now, let a ′ ∈ F 2 m , a ′ = 0, we have
So we have Im(D
Thanks to Lemma 4.4, for power functions we can strengthen Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.5. Let f be a vBf permutation on F 2 m that is weakly-APN but not APN. If f (x) = x d , then f is AC.

Remark 4.6. Given an arbitrary vBf there are three possible cases: f is either crooked or anticrooked or neither. However, Lemma 4.4 shows that for a power function there are only two possible cases: f is either crooked or anti-crooked.
We want now to investigate condition that guaranty the anti-crookedness of a Boolean function.
A vBf can also be represented by m Boolean functions of m variables, the combinations of those functions are called components. We denote by < f , v > the combination corresponding to v. We recall the following non-linearity measure, as introduced in [12] :
For all a ∈ F m \ {0}, let V a be the vector space (D a f ) .
Finally,n( f ) = 0 if and only if V a = {0} for all a ∈ F m \ {0}, and so our claim follows.
Obviously, for any affine subspace W , Im(D a f ) ⊂ W =⇒ Im(D a f ) = W and so we have the next corollary.
Corollary 4.8. Let f be a vBf. Ifn( f ) = 0 then f is AC.
Coming back to power functions it is important to recall a result by Kyureghyan.
Theorem 4.9 ([18]). The only crooked APN power functions in F 2 n are those with exponent
Recalling that the known exponents of APN power functions (up to factor 2 i ) are
if m = 2l + 1 also Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 4.4 and the theorem above. For the case of the patched inversion, from Corollary 4.5, it is AC also in even dimension.
Having examined some anti-crooked functions we would like to show some properties of this notion.
Lemma 4.11. If f is AC then f −1 is not necessarily AC.
Proof. We provide an explicit example f : F 6 → F 6 defined by f (x) = x 49 , then f −1 (x) = x 5 . A computer check shows that f is anti-crooked while f −1 is not. In particular, Im(D e 6 ( f −1 )) is an affine subspace of dimension 4, where e is a primitive element of F 64 such that e 6 = e 4 + e 3 + e + 1.
We recall that two vBf's f and f ′ are called CCZ-equivalent if their graphs
We recall also that f and f ′ are called EA-equivalent if there exist three affine functions g, g ′ and g ′′ such that f ′ = g ′ • f • g + g ′′ . Lemma 4.11 and the well-known fact that a vBf f is CCZ-equivalent to f −1 imply the following result.
Corollary 4.12. The anti-crookedness is not CCZ invariant.
On the other hand, surprisingly anti-crookedness behaves well with EA invariance, as shown below.
Proposition 4.13. The anti-crookedness is EA invariant.
Proof. Let f be a vBf anti-crooked, and let g be a vBf such that f and g are EA equivalent. Then, there exist three affinities λ 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 such that g = λ 1 f λ 2 + λ 3 . Without loss of generality we can suppose f (0) = g(0) = 0 and λ i (0) = 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3. Then
, thus g is AC if and only if f is AC.
A block cipher with a hidden sum
In this section we give an example, in a small dimension, of a translation based block cipher in which it is possible to embed a hidden-sum trapdoor. The underlying field is binary and all involved functions are vBf's.
Let m = 3, n = 2, then d = 6 and we have the message space V = (F 2 ) 6 . The mixing layer of our toy cipher is given by the matrix 
Note that λ is a proper mixing layer (see Definition 3.2 [1] ). The bricklayer transformation γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 ) of our toy cipher is given by two identical S-boxes
where α is a primitive element of F 2 3 such that α 3 = α + 1. The S-box γ 1 is 4-differential uniform but it is not anti-crooked, since Im(D α 2 γ 1 ) is an affine subspace (of dimension 1).
We show now the existence of a hidden-sum trapdoor for our toy cipher. We consider the hidden sum Thanks to the previous theorem, • ′ is a hidden sum for our toy cipher, but it remains to verify whether it is possible to use it to attack the toy cipher with an attack that costs less than brute force. We have not discussed the key schedule and the number of rounds yet. We have in mind a cipher where the number of rounds is so large to make any classical attack useless (such as differential cryptanalysis) and the key scheduling offer no weakness. Therefore, the hidden sum will actually be essential to break the cipher only if the attack that we build will cost significantly less than 64 encryptions, considering that the key space is (F 2 ) 6 .
Remark 5.2. Given a sum ✷, the vectors e 1 , e 2 , e 3 may not be a linear basis of (V 1 , ✷). For this specific sum •, the vectors e 1 , e 2 , e 3 actually form a basis for (V 1 , •) as can be checked by computer. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) ∈ V 1 , from (6) we can simply write 
and our claim is proved.
Thanks to the previous remark we can find the coefficients of a vector v ′ = (v, u) ∈ V with respect to • ′ by using the following algorithm separately on the two bricks of w.
Algorithm 1.
Input: vector x ∈ F 3 2 Output: coefficients λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 . Let ϕ = ϕ k be the encryption function, with a given unknown session key k. We want to mount two attacks by computing the matrix M representing ϕ ∈ AGL(V, • ′ ), which exists thanks to Theorem 5.1. Assume we can call the encryption oracle. Then M can be computed from the 6 ciphertexts ϕ(e ′ 1 ), . . . , ϕ(e ′ 6 ), since the [ϕ(e ′ i )]'s represent the matrix rows. In other words, we will have
for all v ′ ∈ V , where the product row by column is the standard scalar product. The knowledge of M and M −1 provides a global deduction (reconstruction), since it becomes trivial to encrypt and decrypt. However, we have an alternative depending on how we compute M −1 :
• if we compute M −1 from M, by applying for example Gaussian reduction, we will need only our 6 initial encryptions;
• else we can compute M −1 from the action of φ −1 , assuming we can call the decryption oracle, simply by performing the 6 decryptions φ −1 (e ′ i ); indeed, the rows of M −1 will obviously be [φ −1 (e ′ i )]. The first attack requires more binary operations, since we need a matrix inversion, but only 6 encryptions. The second attack requires both 6 encryptions and 6 decryptions, but less binary operations. The first attack is a chosen-plaintext attack, while the second is a chosen-plaintext/chosenciphertext attack. Both obtain the same goal, that is, the complete reconstruction of the encryption and decryption functions. Note that, since an encryption/decryption will cost a huge number of binary operations in our assumptions (we are supposing that many rounds are present), the first attack is more dangerous and its cost is approximately that of 6 encryptions, while the cost of the second attack is approximately 12 encryptions (being the cost of an encryption close to the cost of a decryption).
